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Abstract 
National parliaments have the potential to serve as transmission belts between the 
European Union (EU) and their citizens. By publicly communicating EU issues, they can 
enhance the visibility, public accountability and ultimately the legitimacy of supranational 
governance. Not least since the Eurozone crisis, this task has become increasingly important 
in the ever more politicised context of EU integration characterised by public and partisan 
contestation. Against this background, the aim of the paper is to investigate the 
communication efforts of national parliaments in EU affairs and, in particular, to analyse the 
impact of the levels of contestation of EU issues both within the public and the parliamentary 
arena on their communication activities. In a nutshell, in how far has political contestation 
acted as a catalyst for parliamentary communication of EU affairs? Our data on plenary 
activities in seven EU parliaments from 2010 to 2013 reveals that political contestation in 
public opinion has a positive impact, while contestation within parliament may hamper 
communication of EU affairs.  
Keywords: National Parliaments, European Integration, Contestation, Parliamentary 
Communication 
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Introduction 
National parliaments have the potential to serve as transmission belts between the 
European Union (EU) and their citizens. Much of the existing literature has focused on the 
role of parliaments in scrutinising, monitoring and controlling (their government’s) EU 
policy-making. Recently, however, the parliamentary communication function in EU affairs 
has gained increased attention: National parliaments are crucial as arenas for the debates over 
important EU issues and their national implications (Auel, 2007; Auel and Raunio, 2014a and 
b; de Wilde, 2011; Rauh, 2015; Wendler, 2014a and b). By communicating EU affairs to 
their citizens, they not only legitimise national politics in EU affairs, but can also add to the 
legitimacy of EU governance. This task is especially important within the broader discussion 
on the democratic legitimacy of the EU (e.g. Curtin et al, 2010; Follesdal and Hix, 2006), 
where the opaqueness and lack of accountability have been identified as core elements of the 
democratic deficit. Parliamentary communication of EU issues can contribute to making EU 
policy processes more transparent, and thus more accessible to and for their national public. 
In addition, by holding their governments accountable, that is by inducing them to explain 
European issues and decisions, to clarify European negotiation situations and to justify their 
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negotiation behaviour, national parliaments contribute to the public accountability of EU 
policy-making (Auel, 2007). Thus, the ‘communicative performance of national parliaments 
in EU affairs is directly related to the often discussed democratic deficits of supranational 
governance: if MPs raise European issues, they offer a remedy to the otherwise opaque 
procedures, the overwhelming complexity, and the difficult attribution of political 
responsibility in decision-making beyond the nation state’ (Rauh, 2015, p. 118). Importantly, 
this contribution of parliaments to the public accountability of EU policy-making depends 
crucially on whether they ‘make the choices and political alternatives involved in European 
integration visible to the wider public they mean to represent’ (ibid, p. 117, emphasis added; 
see also Norton, 1998, p. 1; Proksch and Slapin, 2015, p. 3). Scrutiny of EU documents, 
monitoring and influencing the government or voting on resolutions can – and often does 
(Auel and Raunio, 2012, pp. 16ff.) - take place behind the closed doors of parliamentary 
committees and still fulfil representative functions such as the representation and aggregation 
of the interests of the represented. Parliamentary communication, however, is a fundamental 
precondition for public accountability and the exercise of democratic popular control over 
government activities. 
The democratic duty of representatives ‘to give convincing accounts of their actions to the 
represented’ and ‘to communicate their reason for action” (Esaiasson et al, 2013, p. 26) has 
become ever more important in EU politics with the growing salience and public contestation 
of EU issues in both public opinion and national party politics, a phenomenon commonly 
discussed as the politicisation of EU politics (De Wilde and Zürn, 2012; Hutter and Grande, 
2014; Kriesi and Grande, 2014; Rauh and Zürn, 2014; Statham and Trenz, 2012). The impact 
of EU decisions is, especially in the context of the eurozone crisis, increasingly (and 
painfully) evident for the citizens in the EU (Hurrelmann, 2014). While the famous term 
‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970) has long served well to describe the 
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friendly ignorance of citizens towards the European Union, it has given way to a more 
‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2009) marked by growing public 
Euroscepticism and contestation of EU politics (Serricchio et al, 2013; Usherwood and 
Startin, 2013). Moreover, in their study of EU politicisation trends among citizens, 
Hurrelmann et al (2015, pp. 56-57, italics in original) have found a distinct pattern of 
‘uninformed politicisation’: the salience of EU issues has grown, but citizens’ knowledge 
about the EU remains limited, resulting in ‘a more diffuse yet also more fundamental feeling 
of disenfranchisement’. This sentiment is at the core of the profound disconnect between the 
EU and the citizens. Importantly, the rising public dissatisfaction with European integration 
has also filtered through to party politics (Conti, 2014) resulting in increased contestation of 
EU issues by political parties and turning EU politics into a subject of party competition 
(Kriesi et al, 2010). This has again become especially evident during the recent Eurozone 
crisis with the increasing success of Eurosceptic parties in domestic and European Parliament 
elections.  
Thus, we can observe a growing contestation of the EU both within public opinion and 
within party politics, and both potentially impact the communication function of national 
parliaments. On the one hand, the growing public awareness of the relevance and 
‘consequentiality of EU decisions’ (Hurrelmann, 2014, p. 88) has led to a greater demand for 
public explanation and justification of EU policy-making, and ‘parliaments are one of the 
primary arenas for the public [explanation and] justification of decisions taken in the context 
of supranational governance’ (Wendler, 2014a, p. 549). On the other hand, parliaments ‘are 
an important setting for … party political contestation and polarization’ (Ibid.), where 
parliamentary (party) actors can also actively supply policy choices and position themselves 
strategically for their electoral advantage (Rauh, 2015, p. 117). 
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So far, however, we know little about whether public or party political contestation do 
have an impact on the communicative performance of national parliaments – and in what 
way. As we will argue in more detail below, contestation can provide both incentives and 
disincentives for MPs and parliamentary party groups ‘to go public’. Against this 
background, the aim of the paper is to investigate the communication efforts of national 
parliaments in EU affairs by focusing on plenary debates and oral questions. While 
parliaments certainly have other means of communicating political issues to their citizens, the 
plenary is the most visible arena, and plenary activities are key mechanisms to communicate 
policy positions to the citizens.  Plenary debates are among the most important parliamentary 
means to communicate issues on the political agenda (Auel and Raunio, 2014a; Mayhew, 
1974; Proksch and Slapin, 2015, pp. 21ff.; Rauh, 2015). Debates as such are, of course, no 
guarantee for transparency or accountability as information and justifications can remain 
incomplete or even be obscured by strategies of ‘blame shifting’ and ‘credit claiming’ (Lord 
and Pollak, 2010, pp. 977f.). But public debates provide the means by which the positions of 
some (i.e. government, governing parties) are continuously challenged by others (the 
opposition) and can thus be exposed to ‘the best of disinfectants, sunshine’ (Brandeis, 1914). 
Parliamentary questions, in turn, can be used by MPs to communicate issues in various, direct 
and indirect, ways, for example by requesting information publicly, by compelling the 
government to making a public statement and pressing it for action, or by publicly advocating 
constituency interests (Russo and Wiberg, 2010). ‘Parliamentary question time’ also seems to 
attract considerable public attention, at least where ministers or heads of government have to 
react to questions not known beforehand (Salmond, 2014).  
We therefore use quantitative data on plenary debates and parliamentary questions on EU 
issues in seven member states (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Poland, Spain and the 
UK) over a period of four years (2010 to 2013) to analyse in how far political contestation 
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both within and without parliament acts as a catalyst for parliamentary communication of EU 
affairs. The paper is structured as follows: The first section provides an overview of the, so 
far fairly scarce, literature on parliamentary communication in EU affairs. The next section 
develops the theoretical framework to explain variation in the parliamentary communication 
activities based on agency theory. Drawing attention to the fact that communication mainly 
refers to the role of MPs as agents of their citizens, we develop hypotheses on the impact of 
electoral incentives and disincentives, but also take institutional factors into consideration. 
Section three presents the data, followed by the empirical analysis in section four. The final 
section discusses the findings and concludes.   
 
Beyond Scrutiny: Communication of EU Affairs 
The role of national parliaments in the EU has generated considerable academic interest 
over the last years (for excellent overviews see Winzen, 2010; Rozenberg and Hefftler, 
2015). Yet, due to the main focus on the scrutiny and control function of national parliaments 
in EU matters, we still know little about parliamentary communication in EU affairs. 
Empirical research focussing on parliamentary communication prior to 2010 gave little 
reason to be very optimistic. A study by Bergman et al (2003, p. 175) found a generally weak 
involvement of the plenaries in EU affairs. ‘Europe’ seemed rarely a topic outside of debates 
about Treaty changes (Maatsch, 2010) or on sessions of the European Council (Van de Steeg, 
2010). Similarly, a comparison of EU debates in four national parliaments during 2002 and 
2010 confirmed that, with the exception of the German Bundestag, especially day-to-day EU 
matters were rarely debated (Auel and Raunio, 2014b). Debates did, occasionally, take place 
on high profile EU decisions, such as the Service Directive, but often only after an ex-ante 
politicisation of the issue by actors outside the parliamentary arena and intensive reporting in 
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the media (Miklin, 2014). Interestingly, De Ruiter (2014) found a similar reluctance to 
communicate EU matters regarding policy issues integrated under the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) – even though OMCs deal with policy issues that are highly relevant 
from an electoral point of view, such as employment or social policy. Garcia Lupato’s (2012) 
analysis of budget and investiture debates in Italy and Spain, finally, showed ‘that there is not 
a real debate on European issues in general parliamentary debates. This de-politicization can 
… produce a clear deficit in the relation between the parliamentary debate, political 
competition and the voters’ (ibid, p. 106).  
Yet there are indications that the EU has since become a more important topic in Europe’s 
plenaries. Rauh’s study of plenary debates in the German Bundestag, for example, shows that 
‘the degree to which the supranational polity, its politics and its policies are mentioned in the 
publically visible plenary debates has significantly and substantially increased over the last 
23 years’ (Rauh, 2015, p. 13). Other studies suggest that especially the eurozone crisis had a 
rather strong effect in terms of parliamentary communication. Auel and Höing (2015), for 
example, conclude that the crisis had a considerable impact on plenary debates between 2010 
and 2012: across all 27 national parliaments of the EU, on average more than 40 per cent of 
all EU debates focused on crisis-related issues. Studies have also found an increased 
politicisation of the EU in the plenaries due to the crisis, although the findings differ with 
regard to the lines along which polarisation took place. Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra 
(2013, pp. 575-6) show that opposition parties in Austria, Germany and Italy fiercely 
contested ‘the socio-economic orientation of the policies (e.g. social European market order 
vs. neoliberal) as well as the advocacy of allegedly inevitable accompanying measures (e.g. 
further austerity measures), and demanded a different direction for policies (e.g. a financial 
transaction tax; more equitable distribution of tax burdens)’. Wendler’s results (2014b) 
suggest a deepened party polarisation over both, EU integration and competing party 
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ideologies in the debates on the crisis management and EMU development in Austria, France, 
Germany and the UK. Closa and Maatsch’s (2014) findings highlight the impact of 
parliamentary Euroscepticism and the government-opposition divide on debates regarding the 
European Financial Stability Facility. In contrast, Maatsch (2014) concludes that debtor or 
donor status with regard to the crisis bailouts had a stronger impact on parties’ positioning in 
debates on anti-crisis measures than the parties’ ideological position on the left-right 
dimension.  
These findings suggest that the growing public politicisation of EU politics is, at least as 
far as eurozone crisis issues are concerned, mirrored within domestic parliamentary arenas. 
Yet they tell us little about the more general extent to which national parliaments have 
communicated EU issues to their citizens and in how far this is related to and affected by 
political contestation. Given the time period covered by our data, we are not able to analyse 
whether parliamentary communication has indeed increased in comparison to earlier periods, 
for example as a reaction to the eurozone crisis. Moreover, the quantitative nature of our data 
does not allow us to analyse the degree of politicisation of EU issues in terms of polarisation. 
It can only provide a comparative analysis of politicisation in terms of the relative salience of 
EU issues for parliamentary communication. Rather, the aim of the paper is to contribute to 
the literature by investigating the impact of the levels of contestation over EU issues both 
within the public and the parliamentary arena on the communication activities of national 
parliaments. In the following, we develop a theoretical framework based mainly on electoral 
incentives and disincentives for members of parliament (MPs) and parliamentary party 
groups (PPGs) to communicate European issues to their citizens. In addition, we take 
institutional factors into account. 
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Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses  
Synthesising common features of both classic and more recent accounts of the 
parliamentary communication function (e.g. Bagehot, 2009 [1867]; Mill, 1998 [1861]; 
Patzelt, 2003; Packenham, 1970; Raunio, 2011), we define parliamentary communication as 
public efforts by a parliamentary actor of informing, educating and/or mobilizing citizens. 
Such communication can be provided by parliamentary actors at three different levels 
(Marschall, 1999, p. 23): individual MPs, PPGs and by the parliament as an institution. 
Communication by MPs and PPGs follows a different logic than communication by the 
parliament as an institution (Sarcinelli and Tenscher, 2000, p. 86; Pollak and Slominski, 
2014): Because the former compete for votes, they follow the rules of political competition 
and mainly focus on mobilisation. Parliaments as institutions, in contrast, provide neutral and 
balanced parliamentary information. Communication is more of an ‘educational undertaking’, 
a ‘civic education project aiming to enhance the political knowledge of the electorate’ (Pollak 
and Slominski, 2014, p. 111).  
In this study, we focus on communication by MPs and parliamentary party groups in the 
plenary and draw on rational choice and agency theory. Both have become prominent 
approaches to the study of political representation in general and the role of national 
parliaments in EU affairs in particular. Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991, pp. 239-40) define an 
agency relationship as ‘established when an agent has delegated … the authority to take 
action on behalf of … the principal’. One of the basic assumptions of agency theory is that 
any delegation of power to an agent creates risks for the principal in terms of agency loss 
(Lupia, 2003). Within the literature on national parliaments in EU affairs, the main focus has 
so far been on the various means of scrutinising and controlling their agent – the government 
- they can employ to prevent agency loss in terms of EU policy output and outcome. When it 
comes to the communication function, however, the logic is somewhat different from that 
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underlying scrutiny and oversight activities: Here, MPs act as agents of their citizens – and in 
most cases they would very much like to keep that job. In one of the most influential 
contributions, Mayhew (1974, p. 5) argued that legislative behaviour could be best 
understood if legislators were seen as ‘single-minded seekers of reelection’. We follow Cox 
and McCubbins (1993, p. 100; see also see also Katznelson and Weingast, 2005, p. 8; 
Schlesinger, 1991, pp. 39-40) in accepting ‘the usual emphasis on re-election’ as not 
necessarily the only, but the most important component of legislators’ motivation that ‘is 
reasonable to consider in isolation’.  
To be re-elected by their voters, MPs and PPGs must demonstrate credibility and signal to 
their voters that they represent their interests (Behnke, 2008, p. 14; see also Fenno, 1977, pp. 
898-9). In other words, they have to convince their own principals that agency loss is 
negligible. We therefore expect them to communicate EU issues more frequently if they are 
faced with high levels of salience of and scepticism towards EU issues within the general 
public (external contestation). At the same time, however, contestation of EU issues within 
parliament, especially between governing parties, may make it more difficult for them to 
signal trustworthiness and thus may decrease parliamentary communication of EU issues 
(internal contestation). In the following, we develop hypotheses on the impact of electoral 
incentives based on external and internal contestation on the level of parliamentary 
communication in EU affairs. Moreover, institutional aspects are considered. 
 
External Contestation: EU Salience and Public Euroscepticism  
As outlined above, we assume that in member states where public opinion is generally 
more critical of EU integration, MPs as citizens’ agents have an incentive to communicate 
EU affairs due to the potential electoral impact of EU politics. The greater the level of public 
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Euroscepticism, the more MPs and their parliamentary party groups need to try and (re-)gain 
voters’ trust in the European integration project in general and their own European policies in 
particular. Public Euroscepticism, however, can be expected to have less of an electoral 
impact, if coupled with lukewarm salience of EU issues. Studies have indeed repeatedly 
shown the importance of high EU issue salience for issue voting in national elections (e.g. De 
Vries, 2007, 2010a). In other words, if EU issues do not play a vital role in voters’ 
considerations, it does not matter as much whether or not they hold Eurosceptic opinions. 
MPs in member states, where EU issues are more salient, are therefore expected to have a 
greater electoral incentive ‘to profile themselves on these issues and signal their positions to 
voters’ (De Wilde, 2010, p. 72).  
H1: Public Euroscepticism: The stronger Euroscepticism in public opinion, the more 
MPs/parliamentary party groups communicate EU affairs.  
H2: Public EU Salience: The more salient EU affairs are in public perception, the more 
MPs/parliamentary party groups communicate EU affairs.  
 
Internal Contestation: Parliamentary Euroscepticism and Coalition Disagreement 
Above, we discussed our assumptions about the general impact of electoral incentives on 
parliamentary communication efforts and highlighted public Euroscepticism and the salience 
of EU issues. However, these general assumptions have to be qualified as it may not always 
be in the interest of parties to politicise EU issues. For mainstream parties (and especially 
governing parties, see below), EU issues are often more a liability than an asset (De Vries, 
2010b). Reasons are internal dissent over EU integration (Edwards, 2009) or the fact that they 
are generally more Europhile than their voters (Mattila and Raunio, 2012). This leads to two 
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expectations: First, we expect the electoral incentives discussed above to be greatest for 
Eurosceptic parties on both ends of the political spectrum. While Eurosceptic parties on the 
right tend to capitalise on issues of national sovereignty and identity, parties on the left appeal 
more to fears of a ‘neoliberal’ Europe and social insecurities (De Vries and Edwards, 2009). 
Hence, both left and right wing Eurosceptic parties have an incentive to politicise EU topics, 
not least by triggering public confrontations in parliament, and may thus also force 
mainstream parties to respond.  
H3: Share of Eurosceptic parties: The greater the share of Eurosceptic parties in 
parliament, the more MPs/parliamentary party groups communicate EU affairs. 
Second, while mainstream parties are usually more supportive of European integration we 
can also find parties that are much less enthusiastic – the British Conservatives being the 
most famous example. This creates problems especially for coalitions. While disagreements 
between coalition partners increase the incentives to ‘police the bargain’ (Martin and 
Vanberg, 2004; see also Winzen, 2013, pp. 304-305), governing parties have no incentive to 
wash their dirty laundry in public, but rather to smooth out dissent internally to uphold ‘the 
public impression of efficiency and competence’ (Schüttemeyer, 2009, p. 5; see also Auel, 
2007). Thus, stronger disagreement between coalition partners on EU issues is expected to 
act as a disincentive for parliamentary communication.  
H4: Coalition disagreement over EU integration: The greater the disagreement over 
European integration between governing parties, the less MPs/parliamentary party 
groups communicate EU affairs. 
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Institutional (Dis)incentives 
Finally, we also take into account that legislative behaviour in general not only depends on 
electoral, but also on institutional incentives (Shepsle, 1989; Strøm, 1997). One institutional 
factor that immediately comes to mind is the classic distinction between working and 
debating parliaments (Loewenberg and Patterson, 1979; Polsby, 1975). However, recent 
studies have found this classic distinction to play no role when it comes to the 
communication of EU politics (Auel and Raunio, 2014b). This finding is related to a second 
factor, the degree of delegation of EU affairs to committees. While we can generally observe 
a strong emphasis on committee work in EU affairs, national parliaments differ with regard to 
whether committees are able to take decisions on behalf of the whole parliament or whether 
the plenary has to be involved. Yet the assumption that the level of delegation has an impact 
on the debating activity of national parliaments in EU affairs has also been disconfirmed in 
recent research (Auel et al, 2015a). 
What research has shown, however, is that the level of EU scrutiny activity of national 
parliaments depends to a considerable extent on their institutional strength in EU affairs 
(Auel et al, 2015a). This is not surprising, given that institutional opportunities are a 
precondition for effective scrutiny activity. When it comes to parliamentary communication 
of EU issues, however, it has been argued that a different logic may be at play and that 
stronger institutional power may indeed lead to less communication of EU issues. Governing 
parties, in particular those of strong national parliaments, may rather want to monitor the 
government behind closed doors without public criticism that might damage the reputation of 
the cabinet (Auel 2007; Auel and Raunio 2014b). For example, the main parties in the strong 
Nordic parliaments have deliberately ‘depoliticised’ European integration through cross-party 
cooperation in the EAC with the aim of manufacturing consensus in national integration 
policy (Bergman and Damgaard eds., 2000; Raunio, 2014). Thus, it can be expected that MPs 
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in institutionally strong parliaments, i.e. those with effective oversight instruments, focus 
more on influencing policy behind closed doors in committee or parliamentary party group 
meetings. On the contrary, MPs in institutionally weaker parliaments may try to compensate 
this lack of control via a stronger focus on the communication function (Auel and Rittberger, 
2006). 
H5: Competition between control and communication function: The stronger 
parliamentary control and oversight powers in EU affairs, the less MPs/parliamentary 
party groups communicate EU affairs. 
 
Case Selection, Data and Operationalization 
For the empirical analysis we selected the parliaments (lower houses only) of Austria, 
Finland, France, Germany, Poland, Spain and the UK. These seven member states were 
chosen to provide a representative subgroup in terms of size, length of membership, 
geographical location and public opinion on EU integration. In addition, their parliaments 
differ in terms of their formal power in EU affairs (Auel et al, 2015b), the share of 
Eurosceptic parties as well as the type of government.  
 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables consist of oral questions and plenary debates on EU issues in 
these seven parliaments over a period of 4 years (2010 to 2013). To ensure that results are not 
biased by the size of parliament, we divided the absolute number of oral questions by the 
number of MPs. In addition, we accounted for differences in parliamentary rules and routines 
by calculating the share of questions on EU issues out of all questions as well. Similarly, to 
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take into account that the length of debates varies between parliaments, we not only looked at 
the absolute number of debates on EU topics in 2010-2013, but also at the share of plenary 
debating time spent on debating EU issues.
1
 Data on the parliamentary activities was 
collected in the context of the PACE – Parliamentary Communication of Europe research 
project, using mainly parliamentary websites as sources.
2
 In addition, we draw on data 
collected in the context of the OPAL project (see Auel et al, 2015a). 
 
Independent Variables  
Public Euroscepticism: To test the impact of public Euroscepticism, we draw on 
Eurobarometer data that measures the percentage of citizens stating that they ‘do not trust the 
EU’ per year (annual average of the Eurobarometer Surveys 73-803).  
Salience: Unfortunately, the salience of EU issues or EU integration in public opinion is 
difficult to measure. We therefore used the trend in turnout across the elections of 2009 and 
2014 as a proxy. We are, of course, aware that turnout at EP elections depends on a number 
of factors. Yet, inter alia, turnout can be interpreted as the percentage of voters for whom the 
EU is salient enough to take part in the elections. Whether they do so because they are 
Eurosceptic or more Europhile is not relevant for the measure of salience. We use the change 
in turnout between the elections in 2009 and 2014 to capture whether the salience has 
increased or decreased over the course of our period of investigation.
4
  
                                                          
1
  Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain information on the overall number of debates on all issues. We 
can therefore only compare the share of plenary time spent on EU debates.    
2
  The data collection took place between November 2013 and September 2014.  
3
 The data was retrieved through the Eurobarometer Interactive Search System, online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en 
4
  An alternative measure would have been the share of respondents who named the EU among the greatest 
problems facing their country in the European Election Study, EES (De Vries 2010a). However, given 
the wording of the question, this mainly measures salience in terms of negative attitudes.  
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Share of Eurosceptic parties in parliament: To measure the strength of Eurosceptic parties 
within parliaments, we calculated the seat share of all Eurosceptic parties for each parliament 
based on the Chapel Hill 2010 data set (Bakker et al, 2015).
5
 
Coalition disagreement: Inspired by Winzen (2013, p. 310), we calculated the standard 
deviation of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2010 scores for the position on EU 
integration for the governing parties.  
Institutional Strength in EU affairs: To test the hypothesis on the institutional strength in 
EU affairs, we draw on the OPAL score of institutional strength (Auel et al, 2015b), which 
measures parliamentary strength in EU affairs along three dimensions: access to information, 
the parliamentary infrastructure and oversight powers. Since we are especially interested in 
the trade-off between parliamentary influence and communication, we use the scores for 
formal oversight powers only.  
Table 1 provides an overview over our dependent and independent variables. 
Table 1: Overview Variables 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
No oral questions/MP .071 .067 0 .274 
Share oral questions 5.073 5.095 0 24.138 
No debates 21.36 12.93 4 51 
Share of plenary time 8.17 5.20 2.21 23.25 
Public Euroscepticism 54.96 10.31 32 73 
Salience 1.06 1.99 -1.06 4.83 
Eurosceptic parties 20.83 17.44 0 48.58 
Coalition disagreement .665 .598 0 1.87 
Formal oversight rights .539 .188 .25 .75 
                                                          
5
  The Chapel Hill data is based on expert surveys; respondents were asked to assess ‘the general position 
on European integration that the party leadership took over the course of 2010’ on a scale from 1 = 
strongly opposed to 7 = strongly in favour. A party was considered as Eurosceptic if it had a score of 3.5 
or below.  
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Let’s talk Europe – Empirical Analysis 
To test the hypotheses developed above, we ran a multiple linear regression analysis using 
STATA 13. Since our observations are nested within parliaments (four years per parliament), 
we used a regression with clustered standard errors (Primo et al, 2007) (Table 2). Running a 
regression with such a small number of cases does, of course, mean that the results have to be 
interpreted with special care. We have selected our cases carefully, but the possibility to draw 
generalised conclusions on the basis of seven parliaments over a period of four years is 
necessarily limited.  Thus, we interpret the results as broad findings rather than as precise 
statistical results. In addition, we provide added-variable plots to illustrate the findings.  
Table 2: Regression results 
Variables 
Oral 
questions 
Share Oral 
questions 
Number of 
debates 
Percentage of 
plenary time 
Formal oversight 
rights  
-.161*** 
(.023) 
11.860** 
(3.285) 
8.045 
(9.784) 
26.635*** 
(1.925) 
Eurosceptic parties 
.002* 
(.001) 
.039 
(.054) 
.786** 
(.166) 
-.217*** 
(.031) 
Coalition dissent 
-.092** 
(.024) 
-5.392** 
(1.391) 
-14.761* 
(4.978) 
4.460*** 
(.656) 
Salience 
.033** 
(.005) 
.516 
(.216) 
5.364** 
(1.259) 
-.144 
(.171) 
Public Euroscept. 
.001* 
(.000) 
.199* 
(.060) 
.473*** 
(.083) 
.109** 
(.029) 
Constant 
.057 
(.009) 
-10.043 
(3.824) 
-21.204 
(11.533) 
-10.441 
(2.528) 
R
2
 .763 .364 .681 .683 
Notes: Entries are coefficients with standard errors adjusted for 7 country clusters in 
parentheses. N = 28, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
As table 2 shows, formal oversight rights of national parliaments do have the expected 
impact on the number of oral questions, but overall our assumptions on weaker parliaments 
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using communication to compensate for the lack of strong oversight rights could not be 
confirmed. Most importantly, strong oversight rights increase both, the number (but not 
significantly at the 95% level) and the share of plenary time spent on debates. Thus, although 
strong parliaments may try to influence the government behind (closed) committee doors, 
there is no indication that this comes at the expense of public debates in the plenary (see 
figures 1 and 2).  
Figure 1: added variable plot ‘no 
debates/formal oversight rights’ 
Figure 2: added variable plot ‘share 
debates/formal oversight rights’ 
 
 
 
This is an interesting result that contradicts findings from periods before 2010. The 
German Bundestag, the Austrian Nationalrat and the Finnish Eduskunta are all parliaments 
with very strong oversight powers and active debaters at the same time. Auel and Raunio 
(2014b), in contrast, have found hardly any plenary debates in the Eduskunta between 2002 
and 2010. The same is true for the Nationalrat, where Bergman et al (2003) found an only 
‘weak’ involvement of the plenary in EU affairs (see also Miklin, 2015). 
Figure 3: Parliamentary Debates by Topic (% of all EU debates in each parliament) 
 
 
Note: Since debates can cover more than one EUR-lex category, the percentages per parliament can add up to  > 100% 
 
 
Although our data does not allow a comparison with parliamentary communication 
activities before 2010, there are, as mentioned above, clear indications that the eurozone 
crisis has had a decisive impact on debating patterns in these parliaments. Figure 3 illustrates 
the distribution of debates by EUR-lex classification to which we added two categories, 
debates on government declarations covering a range of EU topics, and debates on domestic 
provisions for EU politics. As the figure demonstrates, debates concerning the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) were important for all parliaments, but especially for those of 
Austria and Finland. 
Given the importance of the crisis it is hardly surprising that parliamentary communication 
was also clearly a reaction to public opinion. Both public Euroscepticism and, especially, 
salience seem to provide incentives for parliaments to go public. Where the EU is an 
important topic – even if the public is less sceptical of EU integration – parliaments felt 
compelled to communicate EU issues – possibly precisely to avoid (further) increase in 
Euroscepticism.  
While the above shows that parliamentary actors are responsive to public opinion and 
contestation when it comes to communicating EU issues, contestation of EU integration 
within parliament, in contrast, rather leads to a de-emphasis of EU issues: Different positions 
within coalitions on European integration decrease the absolute number of all types of 
activities, and especially the number of plenary debates (Figure 4). These results confirm our 
expectation that coalition partners that disagree over EU issues try to avoid airing out their 
differences in public. Yet this result is challenged by the fact that parliaments with internally 
divided coalitions do spend a greater share of plenary time discussing EU issues, and this 
impact becomes only a little weaker once we remove the two outliers (FI11 and FI13; see 
figure 5) from the data set (see also table 3). One reason could be that EU affairs in general 
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and the eurozone crisis in particular sparked especially long plenary debates in parliaments 
with internally divided coalitions, which clearly merits further investigation.  
Figure 4: added variable plot no 
debates/coalition dissent 
Figure 5: added variable plot share 
debates/coalition dissent 
  
 
A somewhat surprising finding is that – at least in the parliaments under investigation – 
Eurosceptic parties had a fairly weak impact on parliamentary communication efforts. A 
stronger presence of Eurosceptic parties leads to a statistically significant, but rather small 
increase in the number of both oral questions and debates – and it even has a negative impact 
on the share of plenary time devoted to EU issues. This is especially unexpected regarding 
the number of oral questions: While Eurosceptic parties (with the exception of the British 
Conservatives in our sample) as smaller opposition parties often lack the institutional power 
to set the plenary agenda, oral questions could be considered as an ideal communication 
instrument for them. However, as figures 6 and 7 demonstrate, the number of oral questions 
is much more driven by the salience of EU issues rather than the presence and strength of 
Eurosceptic parties. The findings also remain true when we omit outliers from the data (see 
table 3 below).  
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Figure 6: added variable plot no oral 
questions/ salience 
Figure 7: added variable plot no oral 
questions/ Eurosceptic parties 
 
 
 
Figure 8 investigates the impact of Eurosceptic parties on oral questions a bit further. As 
the data shows, Eurosceptic parties in Austria, France, Germany and Poland are indeed 
responsible for a greater share of EU questions than would be expected based purely on their 
seat share (see the comparison in figure 9). However, opposition parties are generally more 
active than governing parties when it comes to oral questions – overwhelmingly so in the 
German Bundestag. More importantly, opposition parties are active question askers 
regardless of whether they are Eurosceptic or not, which explains the overall fairly weak 
impact of Eurosceptic parties on oral questions. Exceptions to the above are the Assemblée 
Nationale and the British House of Commons. In both parliaments, the governing parties are 
more active than the opposition parties when it comes to asking oral questions, and the UK 
House of Commons is also the only case where a Eurosceptic party is in government.   
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Figure 8: Share of oral questions by parties’ government/opposition and pro/anti-EU 
status 
 
 
Figure 9: Comparison of seat share and share of oral questions for Eurosceptic parties 
 
 
Overall, we have been able to confirm our hypotheses only to some extent. As expected, 
external contestation clearly acted as a catalyst for parliamentary communication activities. 
Our expectations about both, internal contestation and institutional incentives, in turn, were 
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only partially confirmed. Especially the impact of institutional oversight rights had a positive 
effect – the opposite of what we expected. Finally, these results also hold if we omit a 
number of outliers from the regressions. As table 3 shows, the strength of some coefficients 
changes slightly, as does the significance of some predictors. However, the results remain 
very similar.  
Table 3: Regression results – outliers omitted 
Variables 
Oral 
questions 
Share Oral 
questions 
Number of 
debates 
Percentage of 
plenary time 
Formal oversight 
rights  
-.131*** 
(.016) 
3.609** 
(.534) 
8.045 
(9.784) 
26.771*** 
(1.446) 
Eurosceptic 
parties 
.002** 
(.000) 
-.014 
(.019) 
.787** 
(.166) 
-.198** 
(.036) 
Coalition dissent 
-.062*** 
(.009) 
-3.127** 
(.830) 
-14.761* 
(4.978) 
3.837** 
(.792) 
Salience 
.280*** 
(.002) 
.921*** 
(.103) 
5.364** 
(1.259) 
-.123 
(.155) 
Public Euroscept. 
.001** 
(.000) 
.094** 
(0.26) 
.473** 
(.082) 
.133** 
(.028) 
Constant 
.055 
(.016) 
-1.384 
(1.342) 
-21.204 
(11.533) 
-11.896 
(2.494) 
R
2
 .877 .670 .681 .809 
N 26 27 28 26 
Notes: Entries are coefficients with standard errors adjusted for 7 country clusters in 
parentheses, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
Conclusion 
Especially since the outbreak of the eurozone crisis, EU issues have gained in importance 
both for national politics as well as public opinion. Against this background, the aim of this 
paper was to analyse the impact of political contestation on parliamentary communication of 
EU affairs. We expected public communication of MPs and their parliamentary party groups 
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to follow the logic of political contestation, and we distinguished between electoral and 
institutional incentives for communication. Regarding the former, our data reveals that 
greater political contestation in public opinion has a positive impact on communication of EU 
affairs. In other words, across our sample of national parliaments a more ‘constraining 
dissensus’ acts as a ‘catalysing dissensus’ with regard to communication. Our results on the 
impact of political contestation within parliament, however, are more ambiguous: The 
presence and strength of Eurosceptic parties is surprisingly not a decisive factor for 
parliamentary communication, while disagreement between the governing parties decreases 
the overall number of communication activities. Overall, this does suggest that parliamentary 
contestation of EU issues does little to further parliamentary communication, and may even 
harm it in the case of internal coalition dissent. Finally, we can also not confirm that strong 
formal oversight rights in EU affairs come at the expense of parliamentary debates.  
While this aspect needs to be analysed in more detail, our findings do suggest that they are 
influenced by the fact that our period under investigation covers the most turbulent time of 
the eurozone crisis. Parliamentary actors, both at the individual (MPs) and collective level 
(PPGs), reacted to greater levels of public Euroscepticism and especially the increased 
salience of EU issues. This is even true for institutionally strong parliaments that previously 
dealt with EU affairs mainly within the committees and provided little in terms of 
communication, such as Austria and Finland. Thus, at least with regard to the sheer level of 
communication efforts, our results support the findings in the literature on the politicisation 
of EU issues within national parliaments. Whether this is a more durable trend that will 
extend beyond the Eurozone crisis, is another question. 
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